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Summary In 2005, the Ministry of Health in Rwanda, with the support of the Belgian Technical Cooperation,
launched a strategy of performance-based financing (PBF) in a group of 74 health centres (HCs),
covering 2-m inhabitants. In 2006, PBF was extended to an additional group of 85 HCs, thus reaching
3.8-m inhabitants. This study evaluates the effect of PBF on HC performance from 2005 to 2007.
Composite indicators for measuring quantity and quality of services were developed and evaluated
through monthly formative supervisions by qualified and well-trained district supervisors. The strategy
was based on a fixed fee per quality-approved service. The entire budget spent on the implementation of
PBF amounted to $0.25 ⁄ cap ⁄ year, of which $0.20 ⁄ cap ⁄ year for subsidies and an estimated
$0.05 ⁄ cap ⁄ year for administration, supervision and training. A positive effect on utilization rates was
only seen for activities that were previously less well organized; in this case, growth monitoring services
and institutional deliveries. The quality of services, defined as the compliance rate with national and
international norms, rose considerably for all services in both groups. A sustained level of quality
between 80% and 95% was reached within 18 months in the first group. A similar result was reached in
the second group in 8 months.
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Introduction
Like many other developing countries, Rwanda is commit-
ted to achieving theMilleniumDevelopmentGoals by 2015.
This reflects on the country’s provision of basic health
services emphasizing the availability and quality of services
offered. Human resources are a critical component of any
health system and the driving force of its performance.
However, it turns out that in many low-income countries,
particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, inadequate health
workers’ performance is a serious problem. The 56thWorld
Health Assembly of 2003 incited member countries ‘to
frame contractual policies that maximize impact on the
performance of health systems’ (WHO2003). Performance-
based financing (PBF) was therefore introduced in Rwanda
in 2002 by international NGOs through pilot projects in the
provinces of Cyangugu (Soeters et al. 2006), and Butare
(Meessen et al. 2006) as an alternative to classical salary
top-ups that were being implemented at the time. These
pilot projects, and literature, identified PBF as successful in
improving productivity or volume of healthcare services and
maintaining or improving quality.
Building on those experiences, in 2005 the Ministry of
Health in Rwanda decided, with the support of the Belgian
Technical Cooperation (BTC), to implement a strategy of
PBF in 74 health centres (HCs) in five rural districts (Ruli,
Rutongo, Kabgayi, Kabuga and Bugesera) and one semi-
rural district (Muhima), covering 2.072.282 inhabitants. In
2006, when the Rwandan Government rolled-out PBF to
the entire country’s HCs, this strategy was extended to an
additional group of 85 HCs in other rural districts and so
covering a total of 3.784.632 inhabitants. Those districts
had been selected because they were not covered by other
PBF initiatives.
Geographical access to the HC in our districts is
comparable to other districts of the country, with 60% of
the population living within a radius of 5 km from the HC,
and 85% of the population living within a radius of 10 km.
Current health indicators provide evidence of progress
attained over the last 10 years, with a high level of
immunization coverage in 2005 of over 90% of DPT
(diphtheria, pertussis and tetanus) third dose vaccine by the
first year of age. The infant mortality rate declined from
152 deaths per 1000 live births in 2005 to 103 in 2007
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(MoH 2007). Although maternal mortality has dropped, it
remained high with 750 deaths per 100 000 live births in
2005. Unmet need for contraceptive methods remains high
and access to family planning services is limited. Only
9.5% of adult women used a contraceptive method in
2005. This shows that there was space for large improve-
ments in family planning services at health facilities.
Health centres in Rwanda deploy 50% of all health
workers in Rwanda and A2 nurses make up 80% of the
workforce with a total average of 10 persons per HC.
Salaries of health workers are financed by various sources
(65% of salaries by the government, 22% by faith-based
institutions and 12% by non-governmental organizations).
Important differences exist between salaries paid to health
workers according to ownership of their facilities. The
monthly average salary of an auxiliary nurse A2 in 2005
was 45 000 FRW and 92 315 FRW in 2007 (US$1 = 555
FRW).
The majority of the population is covered by a mutuelles
community health insurance scheme and coverage in
Rwanda is rather high, with 74% of the population
estimated to have been covered in 2007, compared with
only 7% in 2003. Health insurance became compulsory in
Rwanda in early 2008.
Methods
The PBF strategy was based on a reimbursement mecha-
nism with ‘indicator purchasing’ linked to an integrated
formative supervision system. This was achieved through a
contracting-in approach, which defined clearly the roles
and the responsibilities of the various parties, the moni-
toring system used, the outputs to be purchased, financial
incentives provided and the conditions for payment to the
health facility.
In this study, the design was set as a time series with a
two-staged implementation that allowed to a certain extent
for a control group. A phased implementation of the PBF
strategy, with a first group (group 1) of HCs starting in the
first quarter of 2005 and a second group (group 2) starting
in the second quarter of 2006 allowed for a control in the
first quarter of 2006.
After the decision was taken to link payments to
activities, a set of indicators was established. Those
indicators were classically related to delivered services
(outputs) and to quality of services. The indicators were
covering the minimal package of activities of a HC and
were regularly reviewed in order to avoid long-term
carelessness of activities that are not remunerated
(Table 1).
Pricing was carefully balanced and adapted in order to
avoid distortions in service delivery; payments for quanti-
tative outputs were balanced through a measure of the
percentage of qualitative improvement achieved. Unit fees
for basic activities varied between 100 and 2500 FRW
($0.18–4.5).
The verification of quantity and quality during the
monthly supervision of the HCs by a team of two qualified
district’s supervisors, coached by a team of trainer-
supervisors from central level, prevented abuses such as
unnecessary service delivery. Prior to supervision, HC
auto-evaluated those indicators, and their results were
compared with those obtained during the supervision.
Once the indicators were collected by the supervisors, a
monthly invoice (SY · fee, Table 1) was established and
signed by the holder, who preserved the copy at the HC
waiting for payment.
The payment made to the HC on a monthly basis was to
be considered as an ‘incentive’ or a ‘bonus’ to top-up
salary. In addition, financial support for administration,
supervision and training was also provided. The staff at the
HC had the opportunity to improve their performance, and
hence their earnings, by increasing necessarily both the
quantity of outputs and the quality of services delivered. A
close monitoring and supervision structure was put in place
at the district level to avoid over-reporting.
At the central level, the Coordinating Unit for PBF at the
Ministry of Health and BTC were particularly conscien-
tious on issues of over-reporting and a systematic
re-verification process was applied to suspicious reports of
quantity and quality outputs.
During the PBF implementation, the population in both
groups benefited in a similar way from nationally
organized health initiatives (community health insurance
adherence, free of charge delivery after four ANC standard
visits, free baby cloths when delivering in HC a. o.) led by
the Ministry of Health, as well as from various national
sensitization campaigns launched by the national media
and the civil authorities, which mobilized population
towards the health facilities.
Data on quantity and quality of services were collected
in all HCs from 2005 onwards on a monthly basis by the
district supervisors. The results on quantity of care are
expressed as a percentage calculated by dividing the
observed number of activities at the HC by the estimated
total number of activities expected for the month. The
expected total number for each of the above activities was
for curative services: one consultation per inhabitant per
year; for antenatal consultations: all pregnant women with
four consultations per pregnancy; for vaccinations: all
children £1 year completely vaccinated; for deliveries: all
pregnant women delivering in the HC; for growth moni-
toring consultations: all children >1 year and <5 year with
one consultation per month. For family planning, the
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monthly contraceptive prevalence of the target population
(all women of reproductive age) was used.
Results
Figures 1 and 2 show that there was a positive impact of
PBF on utilization for institutional deliveries and growth
monitoring consultations. A sharp increase occurred after
the start of PBF in both groups. Moreover, the utilization
for both services in group 1 was 1 year after the
introduction of PBF at a higher level than group 2, which
did not start PBF yet. If other influencing factors are the
same for both groups, this increase could be explained as
an effect of PBF. For the other services presented in
Figures 3–6, no impact of the strategy on volume of
activities could be detected.
The results on quality of care are expressed as the
percentage of services validated for quality (Y ⁄X · 100,
Table 1). Figures 7 and 8 show that in both groups, the
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Figure 2 Growth monitoring consulta-
tions.
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implementation of PBF. A sustained level of quality
between 80% and 95% was reached in about 18 months in
group 1 and in 8 months in group 2.
The subsidies received by the HC from 2005 onwards
(Table 2) were linked to the quality of services provided, as
explained above. The majority of the HC subsidies were
used as a salary top-up. A small part of the subsidies was
spent to the functioning of the health facility, but this share
remained relatively small: around 8% in 2005, 23% in
2006 and 38% in 2007. The subsidies were distributed
among the personnel according to criteria (qualifications,
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Knowing that for example, a monthly average salary of an
auxiliary nurse A2 was 45 000 FRW in 2005, 46 000 FRW
in 2006 and 92 315 FRW in 2007, meant that the PBF
strategy added a substantial part to the income of the
personnel as shown in Table 3 and Figure 9. The increase
amounted to approximately 32–78% of the base salary of
an auxiliary nurse A2 as shown in Figure 9. However, in
2005, a ceiling was applied to the amount paid to the HCs
because of budgetary constraints. This ceiling was lifted in
2006 with more funds becoming available.
The average ratio subsidy ⁄ salary of 39% in 2005 rose to
84% in 2006 for all categories of personnel confounded. A
considerable rise of the salaries introduced by the Ministry
of Health in 2007 reduced the ratio for that year to an
average of 40%. More generally, the subsidies paid to the
HCs by BTC in 2005 and the Rwandan Government in
2006 and 2007 amounted to $0.20 ⁄ cap ⁄ year. In addition,
an estimated amount of $0.05 ⁄ cap ⁄ year was spent by BTC
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Figure 7 Quality of services achievement
in group 1.
Table 2 Monthly average and median of subsidies received by the
health centre (in FRW – US$1 = 555 FRW)
2005 2006 2007
All HC 144070 342477 408104
129572 293775 371950
Group 1 144070 361022 408257
129572 296425 377400
































Figure 8 Quality of services achievement
in group 2.
Table 3 Monthly average and median of subsidies received per
health worker category (in FRW-US$1=SSS FRW)
2005 2006 2007
All qualifications 8 850 19270 16129
6 360 14000 14166
A2 Nurse 11 021 25089 20894
10756 20000 18621
A4 Auxiliary 8 284 18763 10704
7 101 16667 9 360
Worker 4 583 7844 6 233
4 610 6667 5 000
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Discussion
According to international literature and reports, for a long
time PBF was considered a strong incentive for health staff
to increase the quantity or volume of their activities,
especially in Rwanda where PBF replaced a former fixed
bonus system it showed to increase this output. However,
the factor that enabled health facilities to score better in
volume increase through PBF might have been a better
financial accessibility through the reduction of user-fees by
health facilities and through the start-up of community
health insurances. In our study, the only quantity increase
through PBF was observed for activities, which were
previously less well organized, child growth monitoring
services and institutional deliveries (Figures 1 and 2). For
both activities, the involvement of community health
workers, who were subcontracted by the HC receiving a
small bonus for every referred client, played on important
role.
Given the multiplicity of health initiatives, in particular
the community health insurance schemes implemented
since 2002 in all districts with an increasing membership of
the population, and other national health sensitization
campaigns, it is difficult in this operational setting without
a proper control group, to tear apart the effects related to
PBF from those other effects. Notwithstanding the fact that
PBF showed limited impact on volume of services, enor-
mous improvements on quality of all healthcare services
(Figures 7 and 8) were observed.
A quality healthcare service was defined as a service
delivered according to (inter)national norms and stan-
dards. In Rwanda, as in most other countries where
first-line services are commonly assured by nurses and
paramedics, internationally recommended instructions for
anamnesis, clinical examination and correct treatment as
well as for preventive care are indicated on standardized
tools such as consultation record forms for preventive
consultations, partograms for deliveries and the use of
clinical algorithms for curative consultations and others.
Correct and complete record forms for every patient,
verified by qualified and experienced supervisors, were
considered as valuable quality criteria.
The monthly supervisions, combined with an auto-
evaluation of the activities performed by the HC, induced
furthermore a continuing learning process boosted by the
fact that only ‘quality assured’ services were paid for. This
shows, as some authors point out, that ‘simple dissemina-
tion of written guidelines is often ineffective and supervi-
sion and audit with feedback is generally effective’ (Rowe
et al. 2005).
It was also expected that health staff would over-
report their activities in the absence of adequate disin-
centives such as application of clear sanctions. Indeed
some over-reporting of cases was seen in the first months
after implementation of PBF because of human errors in
monitoring rather than real abuse. This was quickly
corrected by the monitoring and supervision structures
put in place at district and central level. However, the
role of ‘third-party’ reviews in the verification of results
should be institutionalized and reinforced, for example,
by conditioning the payment to community satisfaction.
The substantial PBF financial incentives (Tables 2 and 3)
provided to the HCs do probably not explain solely the
results achieved. Literature identifies financial incentives as
key in triggering motivation of health workers but those
are neither the most important nor sufficient to achieve
substantial improvements in service delivery or a change in
health workers behaviour (Mathauer & Imhoff 2006).
Strengthening of other components of the health system,
such as data collection, monitoring and integrated
supervision, contributed in our opinion far more to the
results (i.e. quality improvement) achieved. Further
study on cost-effectiveness of PBF (i.e. cost per
additional%, case or point gain of an indicator that is
attributable to PBF) as implemented in Rwanda, should be
undertaken and compared with other quality improving
initiatives.
If PBF is an adequate strategy to increase efficiency of
existing staff by improving quality of health services, it is
unclear if it will correct for the supply of health workers
that is necessary to overcome the shortage and misdistri-
bution of health workers. One of the reasons to implement
PBF in Rwanda was to increase productivity as an
alternative to more conventional strategies to do so.
However, reports exist of already overwhelmed HCs,
suggesting that an increase in investment and recurrent
expenditure for human resources is still necessary. The





































Figure 9 The annual average ratio ‘subsidy ⁄ salary’ per health
worker category.
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change in the remuneration of health providers. The
strategy was also based on a clarification of the responsi-
bilities and roles of the various parties involved in the
integrated supervision, monitoring and provision of health
services. This was achieved through the introduction of
contracting-in mechanisms that clearly defined the roles
and the responsibilities of the various parties, the moni-
toring system used, the outputs to be purchased, financial
incentives provided and the conditions for payment to the
health facility. The PBF strategy in Rwanda built on
essential quality assurance mechanisms such as integrated
formative supervisions. Therefore, this PBF strategy should
be maintained in order to preserve the quality of health
services.
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